


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Personal

and

Official

DIARY

of

LIEUT. GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Commanding General

European Theater of Operations

United States Army

and

Lieut. Commander Harry C. Butcher

Naval Aide

(as prepared by the latter except for
certain notes of Ike's, pages 1 - 22.)

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By: ARK, WARS Date 7/9/76

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1.

COPY OF NOTES MADE IN LONGHAND BY GENERAL EISENHOWER IN PERSONAL DIARIES.

Thursday, January 1, 1942.

I arrived in Washington on December 14, 1941.

Telephone call from office of Chief of Staff.

I've been insisting Far East is critical, and no other side shows should be undertaken until air and ground are in satisfactory state. Instead, we're taking on MAGNET, CYMNAST, etc. The Chief of Staff told me to pay special attention to the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, Australia, Pacific Islands, China!

Friday, January 2, 1942.

Unity of command in ABDA area seems assured. Good start, but what an effort! Talk - talk - talk!

Saturday, January 3, 1942.

Becoming increasingly evident that something must be done in China. War effort lagging there; and China shows signs of being willing to quit. Apparently the British don't take this seriously. They should!

Sunday, January 4, 1942.

Tempers are short! There are lots of amateur strategists on the job - and prima donnas everywhere. I'd give anything to be back in the field!

It's hard to get anything done in Australia. Dive bombers arrived minus essential parts - base facilities are meager - other expeditions, directed by politicians, interfere, notably MAGNET AND GYMNAST. But we're getting some things on the road to Australia. The air plan is 4 pursuit, 2 heavy bomber, 2 medium bomber, 1 light bombardment groups. We're trying to ship staff and personnel needed. But we've got to have ships! and we need them now!

Monday, January 5, 1942.

Ham is to go to a division soon as assistant! Then later he gets a division to command. This W.D. is cockeyed! Ham is one of our ablest - but he, at 52 or 53, must serve an apprenticeship before getting a division! The conversations with the British grow wearisome. They're difficult to talk to - apparently afraid someone is trying to tell them what to do and how to do it. Their practice of war is dilatory.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
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2.

Tuesday, January 6, 1942.

Chief of Staff out of town one day. Would be a relief except that we've so much work we can't catch up anyway. So we'll go home at 10:00 P.M. as usual. Secretary of War with General Drum. Secretary of War with General Gerow and General Arnold.

Wednesday, January 7, 1942.

Have been attempting to arrange better effort for China. Chief of Staff wanted to send Drum to organize air effort - Burma Road - etc.

Two days of feeling bum. Hope it's only flu. Afraid it may be shingles coming back.

Thursday, January 8, 1942.

Still trying to get Navy to run the blockade (by submarine) into MacArthur with some antiaircraft ammunition. Admiral King has issued orders, but I'm still not sure we'll get it done. May merely lose another sub.

Friday, January 9, 1942.

Still working on China problem. Looks like Drum runs out of it. He wants none of it because he doesn't like the looks of the thing. He seemingly cannot understand that we've got to do the best we can with what we've got.

Saturday, January 10, 1942.

Every day the same - 7:45 A.M. to 11:45 P.M. Attended conference this afternoon with Combined Chiefs of Staff. Subject: China - Burma. British, as usual, are scared/ Someone will take advantage of them even when we furnish everything.

Sunday, January 11, 1942.

Everybody has suddenly decided Far East is critical. Now we've all got to find some way to rush troops there, but political situation won't let us give up MAGNET!

Monday, January 12, 1942.


Told Spaatz about trigger motors for A-24's in Australia on basis of MacArthur's radio. Said he hadn't heard of this before!

Somervell (G-4) did a good job finding boats. We'll get off 21,000 men on January 21 to Australia; but I don't know when we can get all their equipment and supplies to them. Ships! Ships! All we need is ships! Also ammunition - A.A. guns - tanks - airplanes - what a headache!

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
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3.

Tuesday, January 13, 1942.

Another day. Yesterday finished and got off long telegrams breaking off command connection between Philippine Islands and Australia so Brereton, in latter place, could operate directly under Wavel, C.G. of ABDA area. Today a wire from MacArthur saying fine!!! But I've got my fingers crossed. I still think he might have made a better showing at the beaches and passes, and certainly he should have saved his planes on December 8 - but he's still the hero!!!

Thursday, January 15, 1942.

Looks like Stilwell may be selected for China. That leaves GYMNAST command open. Recommend three major generals and three brigadiers. Gerow at top of Brigadiers.

I feel that the laborious nature of the procedure for sending a message to ABDA will drive us crazy! On routine and personnel matters, we should have direct channels.

G.H.Q. wants to start a campaign as far south as Freetown, Africa, working north. I disagree!

Saturday, January 17, 1942.

Colonel Hurley, former Secretary of War, is on his way to "X". He was inducted at noon today, and at 1:00 tonight starts by plane via Pacific. He was equal to the quick transition, and I'm hopeful he can do something in organizing blockade running for MacArthur. The whole Far East situation is critical. My own plan is to drop everything else - MAGNET, GYMNAST, replacements in Iceland - and make the British retire in Libya. Then scrape up everything everywhere and get it into NEI and Burma. We mustn't lose NEI-Singapore-Burma line; so we ought to go full out saving them. We've been struggling to get a bunch of heavy bombers into NEI, but the whole movement seems bogged down. The Air Corps doesn't have enough men that will do things.

Sunday, January 18, 1942.

Just another day. Grind away.

Monday, January 19, 1942.

Told Magruder yesterday to get busy on inducting AVG in China and Burma. The AVG needs planes badly - and we're trying to land fifty on West Coast of Africa and fly them over. Wonder how many will arrive? I prepare about six cables a day. In many ways MacArthur is as big a baby as ever. But we've got to keep him fighting.

Tuesday, January 20, 1942.

One hell of a day!

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

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4.



Wednesday, January 21, 1942.

Catching a cold! Hope I can ward it off.

Sent a long cable to Wavell asking advice on Hutch's request for 600 pursuit planes.

Thursday, January 22, 1942.

Hurry up call to go to State Dept. Saw Secretary Hull, in conference with Navy files - Ridgeway. Wanted a bribe to give Chile in way of defense materials, so as to get a favorable note on breaking off relations with Axis.

Scraped up a bunch of C.O.C. and small items of Lend-lease Aid.

Arnold promised 50 A-6's and 17's for distribution in South American countries.

The struggle to secure the adoption by all concerned of a common concept of strategical objectives is wearing me down. Everybody is too much engaged with small things of his own, or with some vague idea of larger political activity, to realize what we are doing - rather, not doing.

We've got to go to Europe and fight, and we've got to quit wasting resources all over the world - and still worse, wasting time. If we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India, and Burma, we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe, to be followed by a land attack as soon as possible. (May 7 - The above plan, which finally won official approval in April, is called BOLERO.)

Friday, January 23, 1942.

Chief says to "get behind communication system". Looks like W.P.D. has to kick everybody in the pants.

Today, in a most flamboyant radio, MacArthur recommends successor in case of "my death". He picked Sutherland, showing that he still likes his boot lickers.

General Stilwell pushed for China job. He's a soldier!

Saturday, January 24, 1942.

ABDA and boundaries changed some for the better. Wavell now responsible for Darwin area. But what a job to work with Allies! There's a lot of big talk and desk hammering around this place, but very few doers! They announce results in advance in a flashing way and make big impressions, but the results often don't materialize, and then the workers get the grief.

Went to Bill Somervell this A.M. to find out what he knows about this landing craft business. He has known nothing of it to date, but is having matter looked up.

Mamie will soon be coming up here. I get weary of going all the way out to Falls Church at 10:30 P.M.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By ARC NARS Date 7/9/76

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5.

Sunday, January 25, 1942.

Spent the morning arguing with A.C. and G-4, showing them how B-26's can get to "X" a lot faster than planned. Sold them the idea, and if we can get a little drive behind the thing, maybe we can get some fighting strength in ABDA. For some reason have been plaguing Arnold about B-25's for Dutch.

Saw Royce for a minute. Back from England.

Had dinner with Clark's this evening. Had to come back and go to work. Since I took a couple of old-fashioneds, I got d---d sleepy.

Monday, January 26, 1942.

Australia-New Caledonia shipments supposedly leaving Charleston today. Part leaves West Coast in couple days. Have never had much faith in New Caledonia garrison arriving there under current conditions. It goes via X. My own opinion is that the whole works will be so badly needed by ABDA, we'll never get this gang to Caledonia. However, we'll see. In the meantime, I'm going to start making up another shipment for Far East.

Got Navy and Air Force together on question of getting torpedoes to X for B-26's, and making sure crews were trained in case. None of the people I talked to seemed to know anything about the matter, but now everything possible seems done.

Tuesday, January 27, 1942.

A Navy officer (McDowell) is trying to act as "U.S. Secretary on Collaboration". His duties are to clear to British all messages that require Combined Chiefs of Staff action. We sent to him, on 21st, an important message to Wavell, asking advice on 600 pursuit ships. This morning we learn it has not yet even gone to British here in Washington! My God - how I hate to work by any method that forces me to depend on someone else. It's typical Navy stuff.

Tom Handy and I stick to our idea that we must win in Europe. Joe McNarney not only agrees, but was the first one to state that the French coast could be successfully attacked. It's going to be one h--- of a job - but, so what? We can't win by sitting on our fannies and giving our stuff in dribblets all over the world - with no theater getting enough. Already we're probably too late in Burma - and we'll have to hurry like hell in Ceylon. The British have to get moving.

Thursday, January 29, 1942.

MacArthur has started a flood of communications that seem to indicate a refusal on his part to look facts in the face - an old trait of his. He has talked about big naval concentrations; he has forwarded (probably inspired) letter from Mr. Quezon; statements (Quisling) from Aguenaldo; he complains about lack of unity of command about lack of information. He's jittery!

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6.

Friday, January 30, 1942.

The news from Wavell is all bad! Troops in Malay giving up and going back to Singapore Island tonight! The British still don't want Chinese. Wrote a memo today trying to smoke out Chinese situation! What a mess. We're going to regret every damn boat we sent to Iceland, etc. Dam 'em, I tried, but I don't wear 45's. So the hotshots can sneer at me. Anyway I got the Ireland movement largely postponed; but not all, and the boats actually moved there could have taken a bunch of AA to Australia. It now lies on the dock! Hell.

Sunday, February 1, 1942.

Events move too fast and keep me too busy to permit the writing of notes! Day by day the case looks worse in ABDA; it is becoming clear that Jap damage to Sumatra airfields is making it impossible for our B-17's to jump from Bangalore (Ind.) to a satisfactory field in Java. Consequently, our air strength is not building up as expected. The Navy made a raid in the Marshalls and Gilberts. Some damage was done to shipping and local defenses. One cruiser and one aircraft carrier of ours sustained minor damage.

Monday, February 2, 1942.

Yesterday, listened to a talk by Bullitt, just back from Near East and Africa. I liked his presentation. He knows, or he doesn't; no quibbling. Doesn't think much of GYMNAST except on a 100,000 basis!!

Tuesday, February 3, 1942.

Looks like MacArthur is losing his nerve. I'm hoping that his yelps are just his way of spurring us on, but he is always an uncertain factor.

The Dutch want planes; the Australians want planes; ABDA has to have planes; China must get them; the British need them in Near East. What a mess!

Wednesday, February 4, 1942.

We've decided to shift a group of pursuits from ABDA to Australia, for use in N.E. against Jap attack. Hope it does some good. Allotted the 2nd group to be ready for action to Australia. Hope it is in time. We made clear we wanted the arrangement to be temporary, so ABDA could get its planes back.

Thursday, February 5, 1942.

Had to change our priorities in sending planes to Australia! ABDA is desperate! Fields getting bombed! Lost 4 B-17's on ground; also 7 pursuits. We rarely lose a ship in the air, but my God, how they do catch us on the ground. Burma situation not quite so gloomy, but God knows whether or not we can save the place. Gerow and I have been yelling for the British to ask for Chinese help; but they (B) are certainly stiff-necked.

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7.

Friday, February 6, 1942.

Information that Chinese and British are finally getting together. We may save Burma yet! The Joint and Combined Staff work is terrible! Takes an inconceivable amount of time. Fox Connor was right about Allies. He could well have included the Navy! We are faced with a big reorganization of W.D. We need it! The G.S. is all to be cut down, except W.P.D., which now has all joint and combined work (a terrible job), all plans, and all operations so far as active theaters are concerned! We need help!

Saturday, February 7, 1942.

Mamie came yesterday. Living at Wardman.

Sunday, February 8, 1942.

Another long message on "strategy" to MacArthur. He sent in one extolling the virtues of the flank offensive. Wonder what he thinks we've been studying for all these years. His lecture would have been good for plebes! Today another long wail from Quezon. I'll have to wait though, because it is badly garbled. I think he wants to give up.

Navy asks for command over our air forces on the coasts.

Monday, February 9, 1942.

Spent the entire day preparing drafts of President's messages to MacArthur and Quezon. Long, difficult, and irritating. Both are babies. But now we'll see what happens. Tonight at 6:45 I saw the President and got his approval to sending the messages.

Tuesday, February 10, 1942.

Attended "Liaison Meeting", State Dept., Under Secretary of State - Brazilian, Chile, Argentine questions - 10:00 A.M.

Six weeks ago Gerow and I predicted to ourselves Navy would demand "Unity of Command" over coast lines of U.S. They have already done so - only, they have limited it to air forces, so far. We're telling them what is plain fact - defense of continental U.S. is army responsibility, and that Navy forces assisting should be under our command. What a gang to work with!!

Monday, February 16, 1942.

Took charge today of W.P.D. after having been here since December 14 on special work in the Section. As "Gee" walked out, he said, "Well, I got Pearl Harbor on the book; lost the Philippine Islands, Singapore, Sumatra, and all the N.E.I. north of the barrier. Let's see what you can do."

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Tuesday, February 17, 1942.

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8.

The Navy wants to take all the islands in the Pacific - have them held by any troops, to become bases for Army pursuit and bombers. Then! the Navy will have a safe place to sail its vessels. But they will not go further forward than our air army can assure superiority. The amount of air required for this slow, laborious, and indecisive type of warfare is going to be something that will keep us from going to Russia's aid in time!! Moreover, the Navy wants us to give it (between now and June, 1944) 1300 heavy and medium bombers, land based. If the Navy is so helpless without air, and its sea operations are going to depend upon air, I wonder why it does not quit building battleships, and start on carriers - and more carriers!

Thursday, February 19, 1942.

Had a meeting with the Navy. One encouraging sign was that they have come to recognize the need for cargo ships! But they'd like us to stop building armament and equipment so they can have more battleships, etc., etc. Wonder how they finally expect to win this war. We've got to go on harrassing defensive west of Hawaii; hold India and Ceylon; build up air and land forces in England; and, when we're strong enough, go after Germany's vitals, and we've got to do it while Russia is still in the war - in fact, only by doing it soon can we keep Russia in. The trickle of supplies we can send through Basra and Archangel is too small to help her much.

Sunday, February 22, 1942.

Went to General Marshall's for Sunday dinner in honor of General Chu and Dr. T. U. Soong - both Chinese. Longest I've been out of the office in day time since coming here ten weeks ago today.

ABDA area is disintegrating! We have concocted a message to MacArthur directing him to start south to take command of Australian area, etc. I've always been fearful of this plan. I think he's doing a better job in Bataan than he will anywhere else. (Draft of message went to F.D.R.)

We've dilly-dallied along about Burma, India, and China. Now, with Singapore gone, the N.E.I. practically gone, and the Japs free to move as they please, we're getting scared. Again, I think, too late! Circumstances are going to pull us too strongly to the Australian area. We've got to keep Russia in the war - and hold India!!! Then we can get ready to crack Germany through England!

Monday, February 23, 1942.

Message to MacArthur was approved by President and dispatched. I'm dubious about the thing! I cannot help believing that we are disturbed by editorials and reacting to "public opinion" rather than to military logic. "Pa" Watson is certain we must get MacArthur out - as being worth "five army corps". He is doing a good job where he is, but I'm doubtful that he'd do so well in more complicated situations. Bataan is made to order for him. It's in the public eye; it has made him a public hero; it has all the essentials of drama; and he is the acknowledged king on the spot. If brought out, public



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9.

opinion will force him into a position where his love of the limelight may ruin him. We're having our troubles in joint Army-Navy problems. Admiral King, C-in-C of U. S. Fleets, and directly subordinate to the President, is an arbitrary, stubborn type, with too much brains and a tendency toward bullying his juniors! But I think he wants to fight, which is vastly encouraging. In a war such as this, when high command invariably involves a President, a Prime Minister, 6 Chiefs of Staff, and a horde of lesser "planners", there has got to be a lot of patience - no one person can be a Napoleon or a Caesar! And certainly there's no room for a Pope or a Gates! It's a back-breaking job to get a single battle order out - and then it can't be executed for from 3 to 4 months!!!

Tuesday, February 24, 1942.

MacArthur says, in effect, "Not now". I think he is right! This psychological warfare business is going to fall right into the lap of W.P.D., principally for the reason that no one else will lead with his chin. We'll probably take it on.

Saturday, February 28, 1942.

I wonder when we're going to get the dope on landing craft! I've got McCarthy trying it now. But no one seems to give a damn!

Sunday, March 8, 1942.

ABDA area is gone. Java is occupied almost completely. The task of reorganizing a command in S.W. Pacific is under study. Australians have made a proposal, through London, that U.S. take Supreme Command. The Navy will probably not agree. Proposal contained in Chiefs of Staff - No. (W) 109. What a headache this combined stuff is!!! We spend our time figuring out how to keep from getting in each other's way rather than in how to fight the war.

Monday, March 9, 1942.

General McNaughton (commanding Canadians in Britain) came to see me. He believes in attacking in Europe (thank God). He's over here in an effort to speed up landing craft production and cargo ships. Has some damned good ideas. Sent him to see Somervell and Admiral ~~Sand~~. How I hope he can do something on landing craft.

Tuesday, March 10, 1942.

Father died this morning. Nothing I can do but send a wire.

One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to shoot King. He's the antithesis of cooperation - a deliberately rude person - which means he's a mental bully. He became C-in-C of the Fleet some time ago.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

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10.

✓ Today he takes over, also, Stark's job as C. of N.O. It's a good thing to get rid of the double head in the Navy - and of course Stark was just a nice old lady - but this fellow is going to cause a blow up sooner or later, I'll ~~get~~ get a cookie.

Gradually some of the people with whom I have to deal are coming to agree with me that there are just three "musts" for the Allies this year: hold open the line to England and support her as necessary; keep Russia in the war as an active participant; hold the India-Middle East buttress between Japs and Germans. All this assumes the safety from major attack of North America, Hawaii, and Caribbean area.

We lost 8 cargo ships yesterday. That we must stop, because any effort we make depends upon sea communication.

Wednesday, March 11, 1942.

I have felt terribly. I should like so much to be with my Mother these few days. But we're at war! And war is not soft - it has no time to indulge even the deepest and most sacred emotions. I loved my Dad. I think my Mother the finest person I've ever known. She has been the inspiration for Dad's life, and a true helpmeet in every sense of the word.

I'm quitting work now - 7:30 P.M. I haven't the heart to go on tonight.

Thursday, March 12, 1942.

My father was buried today. I've shut off all business and visitors for thirty minutes - to have that much time, by myself, to think of him. He had a full life. He left six boys and, most fortunately for him, Mother survives him. He was not quite 79 years old, but for the past year he has been extremely old, physically. Hardened arteries, kidney trouble, etc. He was a just man, well liked, well educated, a thinker. He was undemonstrative, quiet, modest, and of exemplary habits - he never used alcohol or tobacco. He was an uncomplaining person in the face of adversity, and such plaudits as were accorded him did not inflate his ego.

His finest monument is his reputation in Abilene and Dickinson Co., Kansas. His word has been his bond and accepted as such; his sterling honesty, his insistence upon the immediate payment of all debts, his pride in his independence earned for him a reputation that has profited all of us boys. Because of it, all central Kansas helped me to secure an appointment to West Point in 1911, and thirty years later it did the same for my son, John. I'm proud he was my father! My only regret is that it was always so difficult to let him know the great depth of my affection for him.

DAVID J. EISENHOWER 1863 - 1942.

Saturday, March 14, 1942.

Lest I look at this book sometime and find that I've expressed a distaste for some person, and have put down no reason for my aversion, I record this

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one story of Admiral King.

One day this week General Arnold sent a very important note to King. Through inadvertence, the stenographer in Arnold's office addressed it, on the outside, to "Rear-Admiral King". Twenty-four hours later the letter came back, unopened, with an arrow pointing to the "Rear" - thus: (Typist's note: Here a long, heavy arrow has been drawn in a diagonal line underneath and pointing to the word "Rear".) Must have been someone on the Admiral's staff, as he's too big to let a little thing like that bother him.

Thursday, March 19, 1942.

MacArthur is out of Philippine Islands. Now Supreme Commander of "Southwest Pacific Area". The newspapers acclaim the move -the public has built itself a hero out of its own imagination. I hope he can do the miracles expected and predicted; we could use a few now! Strange that no one sees the dangers. Some apply to MacArthur, who could be ruined by it! But this I minimize; I know him too well. The other danger is that we will move too heavily in the Southwest. Urging us in that direction now will be:

Australians
New Zealanders
Our public (wanting support for the hero), and
MacArthur.

If we tie up our shipping for the S.W.Pacific, we'll lose this war!!!
Already committed are -

Air:

2 heavy bomber groups)
2 medium groups)
3 pursuit groups) Australia
1 light group)

4 pursuit squadrons - on island bases.

Ground:

2 Divisions - Australia
1 Division -- New Zealand
1 Division -- New Caledonia
1 Division -- among islands.

This is too much, but I agreed to one in Australia and one in New Zealand to get those people to leave equal numbers in Middle East, which must be saved. More than this will be terrible.

Saturday, March 28, 1942.

I was made a Major General yesterday! Took the oath of office today. Still a permanent Lt. Col., but the promotion is just as satisfactory as if a permanent one. I suppose one could call it the official "stamp of approval" of the W.D.

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12.

I've been trying for some weeks to get some force, ^(Butler) in the Middle East and India. I want to help the British as much as possible - but avoiding use of our ground troops (except possibly one armored division). But I'm scared!! We must save that region or run the risk of losing the war!

Monday, March 30, 1942.

Par. 1, S.O. 79, W.D., announced me as Major General (Temporary) A.U.S., dating from March 28th; ranking from March 27th. This should assure that when I finally get back to troops, I'll get a Division!!!

Wainwright's position is getting bad - food and medicine required, and except for sub there's not much chance!

Monday, April 20, 1942.

MacArthur is getting rid of Quezon - apparently he no longer needs the President. Have had some difficulty answering MacArthur's message due to absence of President (Hyde Park). He approves but wants Ickes and Welles to concur.

The Generalissimo - Stilwell - A.V.G. - 10th Air Force question has been in somewhat of a mess. Have tried to straighten it out - I hope successfully.

General Marshall returned from London last evening. He looks fine. I hope that - at long last, and after months of struggle by this division - we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting! If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing around in the dark.

Tuesday, May 5, 1942.

BOLERO is supposed to have the approval of the President and Prime Minister. But the struggle to get everyone behind it, and to keep the highest authority from weakening it by making additional commitments of air - ships - troops - elsewhere is never ending.

The actual fact is that not one man in twenty in the Government (including the W. and N. Depts.) realizes what a grisly, dirty, tough business we are in! They think we can buy victory!

Wednesday, May 6, 1942.

This morning I attended a committee meeting on "Landing Craft" at which were discussed questions on which I begged the answers last February:

Who is responsible for building landing craft?
What types are they building?
Are they suitable for cross channel work?
Will the number of each type be sufficient? etc?

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13.

How in hell can we win this war unless we can crack some heads? Corregidor surrendered last night. Poor Wainwright! He did the fighting in the Philippine Islands - another got such glory as the public could find in the operation. Resistance elsewhere in the P.I. will quickly close - so it lasted five months.

General MacArthur's tirades, to which T.J. and I so often listened in Manila, would now sound as silly to the public as they then did to us. But he's a hero!!! Yah.

Thursday, May 21, 1942.

I'm taking off on 23rd with General Arnold and others, for a trip to England. We want to see how things are going there on our offensive plan - also Arnold wants to make a deal with the British to effect some kind of re-allocation in airplanes. Under present arrangements we cannot build an airforce - all our planes are taken up so rapidly that we cannot train.

My own particular reason for going is an uneasy feeling that either we do not understand our own C.G. and Staff in England or they don't understand us. Our planning for BOLERO is not progressing! We'll be gone about a week.

Thursday, June 4, 1942.

Returned yesterday from England. I've recommended McNarney to replace Chaney. Also, I've recommended Wayne Clark to command the 1st Corps to be sent to England. I talked with many people in England - Chiefs of Staff (Pound, Portal, Brooke, Mountbatten, Paget, Montgomery, Nye) and our own Commander and Staff. Our own people are able but do not quite understand what we want done. It is necessary to get a punch behind the job or we'll never be ready by Spring, 1943, to attack. We must get going!

Monday, June 8, 1942.

The Chief of Staff told me this morning that it's possible I may go to England in command. It's a big job - if U.S. and U.K. stay squarely behind BOLERO and go after it tooth and nail, it will be the biggest American job of the war. Of course, command now does not necessarily mean command in the operation - but the job before the battle begins will still be the biggest outside of that of C/S himself.

Thursday, June 11, 1942.

The C/S says I'm the guy. He also approves Clark for Corps C.G. in England, and gives us the II Corps. Now we really go to work. Hope to leave here by plane on 22nd.

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Monday, June 22, 1942.

General Clark and I had an appointment with the President and the Prime Minister at noon. Mr. Hopkins was present. Matters discussed were of a general nature pertaining to BOLERO and the exact nature of the assignments for General Clark and myself in England. The President had been informed of an appointment General Clark and I had with the Prime Minister for 5:30 that same evening so after a brief visit the meeting broke up.

The President commented to me personally that he was having a small inter-bureau war because of requests from four governmental departments for the services of my brother Milton. He jokingly remarked that it was taking all his time to decide the merits of the case. I merely observed that my brother was a very able man and the President retorted that he was well aware of the fact - that that was the whole reason for the war.

Tuesday, June 23, 1942.

General Clark and I, accompanied by a group of staff officers, left Washington at 9:00 A.M. on a Stratoliner; - Captain Campbell commanding. We landed at Gander about 3:30 P.M. Washington time, and took off about two hours later. We landed at Prestwick and after remaining there an hour and a half, came on to London without incident.

General Bolte, members of the Headquarters' staff, General Lee and Lord Louis Mountbatten with members of his staff, met us at the plane. Conference that night at the hotel with Lee, his Chief of Staff, General Clark, General Bolte and General Littlejohn.

Time of arrival was 7:00 P.M., June 24.

Thursday, June 25, 1942.

Conferences all day with members of the Headquarters' staff and with General Lee. Points stressed to the staff were -

- a. Each section must bear its share of responsibility and push incessantly toward the attainment of the objective which is to have an army in the field, ready to attack by early spring, 1943.
- b. That each staff section was to contribute its part toward assuring a readiness to fight before that time with whatever might be available at the moment such a fight might be ordered. That plans for this emergency fight would be largely prepared by the Second Corps commander, but with the full collaboration of this staff and the S.O.S.

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15.

(Thursday, June 25, 1942)

c. That an atmosphere of the utmost earnestness coupled with determined enthusiasm and optimism was to characterize every member of this staff and every subordinate command in England; that pessimism and defeatism would not be tolerated, and that any person who could not rise above the recognized obstacles and bitter prospects that lie in store for us, has no recourse but to ask for instant release from this theater.

d. That all staff work was to be characterized by an absence of formality -- that we were not operating or writing for the record but to win the war. Staff officers are free to see the Chief or the Commander at any moment to bring to their attention such matters as are necessary or desirable. They are free to solve their own problems wherever possible and not to get in the habit of passing the buck up.

Press release drafted in Washington given out at first press conference, which was held today. Notes of the conference are kept in separate file "Minutes of Press Conferences."

"I have been assigned to command the European Theatre for United States Forces. The formal establishment of a European Theatre is a logical step in coordinating the efforts of Great Britain and the United States.

"Six months ago the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of the United States heartened the people of the United Nations by moving swiftly to merge the military and economic strength of Britain and the United States for a common effort. At that Washington Conference they set a more effective pattern for unqualified partnership than has ever before been envisaged by allied nations in pursuit of a common purpose. Only recently they have met again to bring combined action into even closer coordination.

"The presence here in the British Isles of American soldiers and pilots in rapidly increasing numbers is evidence that we are hewing to the line of that pattern."

Announcement was made of an intention to move the headquarters outside of the middle of London, and the Headquarters Commandant was given the task of finding suitable accommodations so that a common mess and living accommodations could be established for all of us. A place called Wentworth was suggested as a likely one. General Ismay has promised to help us out in this task. The staff was further informed that all policy-making applying to this theater lay with this headquarters. All subordinate commands are executive and operating agencies, with their functions of planning and policy making applying only to their respective spheres of responsibility and action. It was emphasized that no set scheme of organization, training or concept of command was to prevail over common sense, and in adjusting our means to meet our needs. Absolute freedom in planning to meet our requirements has been granted this headquarters and this imposes a corresponding responsibility to act decisively and promptly and with no alibis to offer.

Arrangements have been made for a group of us to go to Ireland on Wednesday next, returning Thursday. Tonight a group of us are meeting with Lord Louis Mountbatten to hear a lecture given by an officer who participated in the Madagascar operation.

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16.

Tomorrow afternoon I am to call on the three Chiefs of Staff of the British Army. Colonel Stirling (of the War Cabinet Secretariat) visited me this afternoon and among other things, stated that he would arrange for me to pay my duty call on the King.

I explained to Summers my reason for sending him home.

I am living temporarily at the Claridge Hotel.

Friday, June 26, 1942.

This morning I called on the British Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Pound, Air Chief Marshal Portal and General Nye (General Brooke has not yet returned from Washington). Immediately thereafter I called on the American Ambassador, Winant and had a long talk with him. This afternoon I had conferences with General Spaatz, General Clark and General Davison. Questions discussed included many applying to the 8th Air Force, construction of airdromes, and air support for the 2nd Army Corps. General agreements and understanding were reached on all questions raised.

I have made arrangements with Lord Louis Mountbatten to go with him next Tuesday night on a special exercise to witness the landing of tanks during hours of darkness. The following day Lord Louis will put me down in Ireland where I have a date with Lee, Hartle, Clark and Spaatz. This coming Sunday I go to dinner as General Lee's guest and the following Thursday as the guest of General Bolte.

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17.

Saturday, June 27, 1942.

General Clark went to the Southern Defense Command to make preliminary arrangements for the establishment of his headquarters and to agree in principle upon defense missions that would be assigned to his troops.

I held a morning conference with the heads of all Special Staff sections and later a special conference with General Lyon, head of the Technical Air Staff. This last conference developed the fact that a number of functions pertaining to the old "Military Observer" are still being performed by this headquarters. We are quite ready to serve as an agency for the War Department in any manner deemed necessary or desirable but it would appear essential that a new definition of duties in this respect should be given us so that we do not cross wires with the Munitions Assignment Committee and similar bodies.

Conference was held with the anti-aircraft officer and G-3 Division concerning our requirements in anti-aircraft for airdromes in England and for the actual problems of invasion. Anti-aircraft units required for the first purpose must to a large extent, meet those of the second since limitations both in production of units and in shipping, will not permit the fulfillment of the entire requirements as calculated by the staff. A compromise solution is being reached at once and preliminary telegram is going to the War Department this afternoon.

I go to Scotland on Tuesday to witness a special exercise; I go to Ireland on Wednesday and Thursday to see the troops there; Friday I go to the south of England for a special purpose which I will record in more detail after the event. This evening I go to a little affair given in my honor by the Military Attache. Afterwards I have an informal dinner with my old friend Everett Hughes.

Colonel Summers requested today that I revoke his orders for returning to the States. I declined but promised that I would carry him over for about a month so as to avoid the implication that I relieved him immediately upon arrival.

Monday, June 29, 1942.

Conversations with a number of staff officers during the day. Principal topics for discussion involve the organization of theater and S.O.S. headquarters so as to promote efficiency in the use of the technical services. This matter was fought all the way thru the World War, has been the subject of much bitter discussion ever since, and is still a tough one to handle. Most advice is, of course, colored by individuals who subconsciously think of their own power or opportunities for advancement. Even without these difficulties there seems to be no perfect solution. Fortunately I have in Lee one of the best officers of the army and I am confident that he and I together can work out a practical answer that will meet the requirements of the particular problems in this theater.

Another matter that we have discussed all day long is that of promotions to the grade of general officer. General Chaney has previously recommended a number of colonels for promotion but these were held up by the War Department pending my comment. In addition I have two officers of General Clark's staff that were more or less promised promotion in Washington, to become effective upon their arrival in this theater.

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~~SECRET~~ (Monday, June 29, 1942 (con.))

18.

This morning a representative of Colonel Donovan's named Shepherdson, called on me. His purpose was to explain the situation of the C.O.I. branch here with respect to the theater. It appears that he fully understands the necessity for the Theater Commander controlling all activities of a military nature on this front and I have every confidence that his operations will be conducted accordingly.

General Truscott reports that the First Ranger Battalion is now moving to its new station and will start intensive training at once.

This afternoon I visited General Ismay, head of the War Cabinet Secretariat. I assured him that, if the British undertook definite planning for SLEDGEHAMMER, we would cooperate to the extent of our available resources, and on the basis of attachment to their commander. He also offered to help in securing a satisfactory site for a new headquarters.

General Ismay is taking personal charge of making arrangements for my call on the Prime Minister and on the King. I requested him to postpone this until the beginning of next week, due to my crowded schedule of the next few days. He replied that this would be particularly satisfactory from the standpoint of the Prime Minister, who is busily engaged in preparing an important speech to be delivered before the Parliament.

Tuesday, June 30, 1942.

In the morning called on General Paget, accompanied by General Clark and General Bolte. The conversation dealt largely with means and methods for pushing the planning for "ROUND UP". General Paget remarked that "If we could only have your organization, this whole thing would be easy".

General Paget is to keep my staff informed in advance as to meetings of the Commanders in Chief so that I may attend such meetings with members of my staff.

The Chiefs of Staff are likewise to keep me informed in advance concerning meetings at which "ROUND UP" operations will be discussed. I am to attend those meetings.

In the afternoon, Major Forester, British Army, called to see me. He is Press Relations Officer and works in Washington in close liaison with General Surles.

Left at 4:30 P.M. for Scotland with General Clark and Lord Louis Mountbatten.

Wednesday, July 1, 1942.

Went as a member of Lord Louis' party to witness some secret exercises in Scotland, north of Prestwick. The exercises were over about 5:00 P.M. Went to bed on Lord Louis' yacht and got up at eight. Visited a Combined Signal School run by Lord Louis' group, and then went on to Prestwick. Left Prestwick at 11:00 A.M. by plane and landed at Longkesh. Spent the day with General Hartle, General Ward, General Ryder, General Lee, General Clark, and members of their respective staffs.

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Wednesday, July 1, 1942 19.
(con.)

Discussed problems affecting the whole theater as well as those applying to Northern Ireland. Hartle and Lee are to work out a directive under which Lee will take over ordinary functions of the S.O.S. in Ireland. Visited a number of troops of the First Armored Division and had dinner with the headquarters staff of the First Armored Division that evening.

Spent the night at the Grand Central Hotel in Belfast.

Thursday, July 2, 1942.

Returned to London this morning. During the day had discussions with members of the staff, and with General McClure. The latter had brought back with him from Washington, a suggested directive for the placing of the Office of the Military Attache under the Theater Commander. He suggests a slightly different wording in one or two places and I have accepted his recommendations. These suggestions are now being cabled to Washington with the expectation that they will be approved and the consolidation will take place soon.

I am a bit undecided as to the identity of my G-2. I would personally prefer McClure, but this would probably mean the return of Case to the States. Case is a very valuable man and I would like to keep him here. Mr. Matthews, Counselor at the Embassy, called but discussed only general matters of cooperation between the two offices.

At 8:15 P.M. went to a small dinner given by General Bolte. Present, aside from senior American officers, were the British Chiefs of Staff, General Ismay, and Lord Louis Mountbatten. After dinner, drove with Mountbatten to his home near Southampton where I spent the night.

Friday, July 3, 1942.

Early this morning Mountbatten and I visited a ship called the Prince Charles, just ready to leave the port of Southampton as a part of the flotilla carrying a small expedition on a secret mission. On the ship were a few Americans, officers and men, participating in the operation. I had an intimate chat with all of them and found them to be the very finest types of soldier. I was unable to see the entire American contingent as they were scattered among a number of ships, some of which had already departed.

On leaving Southampton, I went to the airport at Worthy Downs, where I met General Eaker. He flew me to an airport in the Huntingdon area, a hundred miles north of London. There were collected the men of six bomber groups who are to take part in an operation tomorrow. I had a chat with all of them, and enjoyed the opportunity to say good luck to them.

While at the airport I inspected a heavy Wellington bomber that had just returned from a raid on Bremen. It had a Polish pilot whose name I do not know. The remainder of the crew were British. He came in with the airplane full of small calibre bullet holes, with every member of the crew wounded except himself, with one wheel shot entirely away and the other hanging uselessly with a punctured tire, the bomb doors hanging down, the exit door of the airplane shot away, and two or three heavy

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~~SECRET~~ Friday, July 3, 1942 (con.)

hits in the wings and engine sections. All pilots examining the plane were amazed that he could fly home. He landed the ship safely and while it will probably be salvaged instead of repaired, he did not cause any further injury to any of his crew.

When authority is obtained for giving American awards to officers of other countries it is my intention to confer a suitable award upon this officer.

This evening I am having Commander Butcher, Colonel Davis, George Allen, and a number of others to dinner. Davis and Butcher arrived last evening.

Saturday, July 4, 1942. 11:15. Attended formal opening of the Washington Club, a club for service personnel established by the Red Cross. Admiral Stark accepted for the Navy — I accepted for the Army.

In the afternoon, at the insistence of Ambassador Winant, I attended a reception at his house, standing in the receiving line. I had understood that it was to be a rather small reception, principally for service personnel. Actually, only a few military individuals attended, but a total number of 2650 passed the receiving line.

In the evening had dinner alone with General Lee, and discussed serious problem concerning organization of the S.O.S. and the division of functions between the Special Staff officers and his headquarters and my own. Both of us are in substantial agreement and it is entirely possible that we will abolish the title of "Chief of Service" in this theater.

Sunday, July 5, 1942. Most of the day in the office, going to Chequers in the evening. General Clark and I went there at the invitation of the Prime Minister. We were due for eight o'clock dinner, arrived there at 7:45. We were met by Commander Thompson, the Prime Minister's Naval aide, who entertained us until the Prime Minister made his appearance. We spent the early part of the evening on the lawn in front of the house, and when the Prime Minister appeared, took a walk with him into the neighboring woods, discussing matters of general interest in connection with the war.

The house at Chequers dates from about 1480 and is on the site of an earlier building of which records are kept dating from 1060. It is rather unpretentious but a very good type of English brick architecture of that time. The principal feature of the house is an enormous living room with the ceiling running completely to the roof, around which are built various offices, dining rooms and dens. On the second floor is a nice movie theater at which the Prime Minister entertains, not only his guests, but all of the retainers of the household. Dinner was at nine with Lady Portal as another guest and Mrs. Churchill present. General Ismay and Commander Thompson were the only other persons at dinner.

In the evening we saw a movie, "The Tuttles of Tahiti", an American picture, starring Charles Laughton. Fortunately it was in the lighter vein, and was hilariously funny. All of us, including the Prime Minister, had a thoroughly good time.

After the movie, the Prime Minister and the rest of us talked until about 2:30 A.M. We were interrupted frequently to receive reports coming from all corners of the world, principally the Middle East and Naval reports concerning the convoy off North Norway. Whenever these reports were of a favorable nature the Prime Minister's

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~~SECRET~~ Sunday, July 5, 1942 (con.)

conversation would glow for the next thirty minutes or so. Conversely, a pessimistic report would get him in the dumps. Upon going to bed at 2:30, I found in my room a book that dealt exclusively with the history of Chequers, together with the furniture and objects of art all over the place. I could not go to sleep without reading that part applying to my own room. I slept in an enormous oak bed, four poster, with enormous bulges on the posts at intervals, each elaborately carved, the whole surmounted by a canopy, which instead of being of fabric was solid oak, apparently about six inches thick. The oak was black, either from coloring or from age, and elaborately carved as well. This room was supposed to have been frequently used by Cromwell, whose daughter had married the then owner of the house. Cromwell's picture hung in the room where I slept. Also there was a desk of inlaid wood that was reported to have been one of his favorites.

We rose at 7:45 in the morning, went downstairs to a breakfast that was typically American. Wayne and I each had two fried eggs and plenty of fried ham. Immediately after breakfast I inspected a Guard of Honor made up of a detachment of the Coldstream Guards. General Clark accompanied me and both of us were impressed by the very elaborate drill, manual of arms and ceremonies that the British have set up for this kind of performance. They were a magnificent body of men, the shortest being at least six feet.

We left Chequers at ten o'clock and arrived in London a bit after eleven.

The subjects discussed in our conversation with the Prime Minister really covered all the theaters of war. We talked generally about the Pacific, Australia, India, China and so on; but in general our conversation was directed toward the western part of Europe and of Africa. It is plain to see that the Prime Minister strongly favors an operation this year in northwest Africa, called in our code names GYMNAST. As a secondary operation or attempt, he favors an effort at northern Norway. He is quite averse to attempting anything on western Europe between Norway and the Brest peninsula. He believes it would be slaughter because we are not strong enough, either in the air, on the ground, or with landing craft to make the operation a success and stay on the continent this year. I pointed out to him many of the disadvantages of GYMNAST (later to become TORCH), and raised the question as to whether such an operation would divert from the Russian front a single German division or a single German airplane. He is quite confident that the Germans would come to meet such a movement the second it started, and is also quite confident that the French would not fight the Americans. I cannot share his optimism on either of these points. I do not mean to say that I believe he is wrong but I do think that it is wrong to count on these two matters being as he believes.

Monday, July 6, 1942. Important conference this morning with General Paget and with members of his staff and the Air Staff. Principal questions discussed were --
a. Projected frontage for ROUNDUP. b. Considerations applying to a 1942 operation. c. Arrangements for insuring progress in planning and in concrete preparations involving joint British-American effort. d. Agreement as to the meaning of the expression "Deterioration in German morale", which is so often used in British discussions of the ROUND UP operation. Upon my suggestion, it was agreed that this term means only that the Russian Army will be in the field at the time of the beginning of ROUND UP, as a fighting force -- it does not include a necessity that the Germans shall have suffered serious tactical reverses.

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~~SECRET~~ Monday, July 6, 1942 (con.)

On recommendation of General Spaatz sent a telegram to General Handy asking him to release Colonel Hansell for service in this theater.

Conferences with staff officers during the afternoon.

Tuesday, July 7, 1942. In a message to General Marshall today, the C.G. emphasized that recent conferences with the British indicate a need for considerable intensification of planning by this and subordinate headquarters. Message weighed the various needs both from standpoint of planning and actual operations at this time. Made clear also that British military authorities do not consider it likely that an attack in Western France (SLEDGEHAMMER) is possible this year under the limiting conditions imposed by the Prime Minister. The C.G. also said he is uncertain as to existing agreements, if any, concerning 1942 operation, and raised the question of whether General Marshall believes that British and U.S. forces in U.K. should now begin concrete preparations, including assembly of shipping and landing craft, to make possible an assault on the continent no later than September 15, and "in the hope that it will prove feasible."

Wednesday, July 8, 1942. General McClure came by for the C.G. and General Eisenhower paid his duty call on the King. At 2:00 in the afternoon Ambassador Winant called on the General and was with him for an hour. In the afternoon the C.G. went down to see Sir Alan Brooke and Sir Charles Portal. At 5:00 Sir Charles Hambro, Colonel Guenther and two other British officers in to see the General. At 6:00 General Ismay and Colonel dropped in to see the C. G. In the evening we attended a small informal dinner given by Sir Alexander Mackenzie Livingstone in honor of the General; about fourteen people as guests. Very informal and quite enjoyable.

Thursday, July 9, 1942. Biggest portion of the morning taken up with photographers. 11:15, Mr. Williams and General Dahlquist in to see the General. 9:20 General Olmstead and staff in to see the General. 9:30 General Truscott in with some news not very satisfactory for the C.G. 12:00 General Ward in re his visit to RAF station. 12:20 Lord Louis Mountbatten in to see General, and later in the afternoon Colonel Lombard of the Free French Forces saw the C.G. 3:30 Ambassador Biddle called. 5:00 General Eisenhower, General Bolte, Colonel Rogers, and Commander to Hounslow Barracks.

Friday, July 10, 1942. C.G. gets his third star and everybody happy. 9:50 Admiral Stark, General Clark in to see the General. Luncheon at Claridges, General Eisenhower, General Clark, Commander Butcher, Mr. Allen and Mr. Kelly. 2:30 General Spaatz in and then to Chiefs of Staff meeting till 5:40. 6:00 Admiral Stark to see the General. Evening, dinner Secretary of State for War at the Ritz, after which Commander Butcher takes over.

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