

SECURITY INFORMATION

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17 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George A. Morgan
THROUGH: Mr. Mallory Browne
FROM: Mr. John N. Anspacher
SUBJECT: Working Group--Berlin

DECLASSIFIED
Authority <u>NLE 2012-28 #3</u>
By <u>CJA</u> NLDD Date <u>07/25/12</u>

It was agreed by participants at today's meeting that the following points should be considered primary in any discussion of U.S. policy towards the Soviet bloc, including East Germany, in the light of current unrest in East Berlin:

a. We should give all possible moral support to the East Berliners' efforts to improve their conditions, in order to help them achieve actual benefits or to stimulate further Soviet repression. This latter would in turn provide us with ammunition at forthcoming political conferences (Bermuda, Korea, etc.), but care should be taken to avoid at all costs any neutralist suspicion of the U.S. as instigators of the East Berlin uprisings.

b. A special fact-finding operation should be initiated to determine first exactly what transpired in East Berlin over the past three days, what its effects are likely to be, and what lay behind the whole affair.

c. Efforts should be made to step up our defector program to take advantage of a relaxation of East-West travel restrictions, combined with dissatisfaction in the East as manifested by the Berlin riots.

d. Wherever possible, our psychological operations should be developed in conjunction with the Germans, at the Governmental level, with the SPD, and with German labor groups, especially. It would be significant, for example, to urge the German labor unions to offer aid to victims of the Berlin riots.

e. It would be psychologically significant at this juncture to capitalize on the Berlin developments in other parts of the world, especially where some resistance has shown its head, such as Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc., but also from the point of view that "such (in East Berlin) is the way Soviet tyranny answers the workers' demands for a decent standard of living." Our world-wide exploitation should

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be in a pattern which suggests that other workers might also press for concessions, but care should be taken not to instigate outright uprisings.

f. A Presidential statement of gratification and encouragement to workers who have taken such initiative should not be sought at this time. When MSA is prepared to announce its appropriations for Berlin Aid, a White House footnote to that announcement would be of important psychological advantage.

g. Any efforts to bring this problem to the attention of the UN (even in the Human Right framework) would be premature at this time. A later date, when more facts are available, a diplomatic offensive, including UN action, might be undertaken.

h. Policy guidance is required before any large scale effort is made, even covertly, to encourage outright resistance in the Soviet zone or other parts of Eastern Europe; what is most important at the moment is to derive all the benefit possible from the East Berlin situation to strengthen particularly a unified Western alliance in the political arena, vis-a-vis the apparent Soviet "peace" campaign and its immediate "unity" objectives.

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Disposition:

1 Mr. Morgan
2 Mr. Browne
P Subject File
P Reading File
Mr. Anspacher
RSB Files (2)

P:JMAnspacher:fbd
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