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I met with President Cevdet Sunay at 5 P.M. December 2, 1968 at his residence. We had met first some years ago when he was Chief of the Armed Forces of Turkey and I was in the Policy Planning Council. At that time, General Sunay was heading a promotions panel with the other members of the Turkish General Staff in Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia. He was extraordinarily cordial to me then and has been on each of our meetings since. He visited Chicago during his official visit to the United States in 1967 and on this occasion I presented him with a folder of photographs of his visit and also a copy of the University of Chicago Press book by Aptullah Kuran on Ottoman architecture.

I then told him briefly of my recent talks with the Shah of Iran, President Nasser and President Azhary of the Sudan.

Turning to Nasser, President Sunay commented that this reminded him of the Turkish saying about hunk! "The Turks say that there is always a group of people who pound up coffee in a mortar and pestle. There is the man who does the pounding and then there are the others around him who encourage him by saying hunk, hunk, hunk. Nasser and the Arabs are like this. Nasser does the pounding but the surrounding Arabs in fact encourage him."

However, he said Arab unity as such is really not possible at this time because of the vast disparity in development and social organization in the various Arab countries. He reviewed in some detail the situation in various Arab countries with particular emphasis on Kurdistan and Iraq. (In the past, Turkish intelligence has been extraordinarily good on Iraq). The Kurds today, he pointed out, find the Israeli issue a convenient excuse for their inability to beat the Kurds. The fact that Iraq has 10,000 soldiers in Jordan gives it a plausible reason for being unable to defeat the Kurdish guerrilla insurgency but this is of course ridiculous, the President commented, since the Iraqis have 70,000 troops in Iraq itself. The President alluded to the massive support given by the Shah of Iran and Israel to the Kurds and obviously was not too keen about this trifling with the forces of nationalism on the Turkish frontier.

Indeed, the sobriety of the Turkish government and particularly of President Sunay is one of its most appealing characteristics in the volatility of the Middle East. Time after time in our conversation Sunay made a gesture of contempt for the petty hostilities and ambitions of the Middle East. One feels extremely strongly even entering Turkey, the solidity of the bureaucratic structure and perhaps the influence either or both of Turkey's imperial past and its

European affiliation.

In Egypt, the President continued, there is neither the moral fiber nor the capability for modern warfare. Nasser personally, he commented, was incompetent to direct an army since he was only a junior officer when he went into politics. Here spoke General Sunay the paragon of Turkish military bureaucracy: Nasser was not really a professional since he had never commanded large scale troops in the field and his activities smacked of the impertinence of a junior officer aspiring to major command.

I told the President what I had told President Nasser about the three lines of policy possible to him (warfare and defeat, some degree of accommodation but still economic stagnation or slow development and a move toward isolationism with heavy emphasis on development.) I also pointed out that in my view the principal problem was whether the Egyptians would in fact be able to opt for real as opposed to apparent power, i.e. to develop their internal resources rather than buying the fancy toys of warfare. The President heartily agreed and said that he thought this was the question of the Middle East, but, he emphasized, Nasser was not only pushed by the other Arab countries but was pinned into position by the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There were, he continued, two possibilities for the Middle East: 1) if Vietnam could be satisfactorily settled, the United States moved strongly and actively toward peace in the Middle East or, 2) if the Soviet activities could lead, as the President believes they are likely to and intended to, to the renewal of war in which the Soviet Union will doubtlessly be of little help to the Arabs but will be of major menace to the other countries in the area. The Soviet purposes, he continued, in the United Arab Republic are to have an army favorable to the Soviet Union and, in event of war with Israel, to develop for themselves a major diplomatic opening.

I replied that while I agreed with the general conclusions, I thought it was most unlikely in the near future as it has been in the past that the United States would intervene in a significant or effective way. Sunay said that he generally agreed with this lamentably. I asked if this meant that Turkey intended to try to play any larger role in the Middle Eastern sphere as the Shah had told me Iran intended to play. He replied that during the recent United Nations General Assembly meeting, the Turkish Foreign Minister had met with the Foreign Ministers of a number of the Arab countries. This, he said, led to a flurry of rumors that Turkey, as an Islamic country, was taking the leadership in building some sort of new Middle Eastern position. Before Turkey even had a chance to refute the rumor itself, there were outcries against this move in the various Arab countries. Again, both in word and in gesture, the President eschewed a venturesome policy for Turkey in the Middle East.

The only solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, he indicated, was an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this connection, he said, Turkey might play a role.

It occurred to me as he said these things that two aspects of Turkish past shown forth in the President's comments: the first is Turkey's definitive and apparently revocable decision to get out of the business of being an empire and the second is its strong identification with Europe rather than with the Middle East.

I raised the question of the current Yugoslav nervousness and the possible consequences of Soviet action in Europe but these did not seem to excite the President very much and he merely commented that he did not believe the Soviet Union would make the mistake of invading Yugoslavia.

Commenting that this was much the feeling of the Shah, I then raised the Shah's attitude toward Persian policy in the Middle East and particularly in the Persian Gulf. I commented that the Shah had dismissed Turkey's role in the Middle East, saying "Turkey is in NATO." The President first smiled approvingly and then indicated he did not fully understand the meaning of this. I replied that the Shah saw the Middle Eastern situation largely in terms of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and indicated that it would be impossible for Turkey to play any role in this area. Looking at the map, the President frowned and asked me to explain further. I commented that what presumably the Shah meant was that in between the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey was a belt of countries more or less impervious to Turkish activities. The President said the Turkish equivalent of bunk and then went on to comment that he felt that Persian policy in the Persian Gulf has been wrong but that the Persians were now learning some degree of wisdom. I asked him to explain this more fully and he said that Persia's attempt to thrust itself forward raised the question of whether the Shah was not doing more than the Persians were capable of sustaining. However, today, he said it was his understanding that the agreement between King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the Shah had resolved the differences on the Persian Gulf. I told him that the Shah had indicated to me that Bahrein issue was still outstanding. President Sunay waved this aside and said that that was a small matter and that he felt that the Persian policy had come to recognize the limit of Persia's capability. I did not raise the point but it is my feeling that this is by no means the case, that the Persian role is expanding rather than diminishing.

I had then been with the President for almost an hour and as he has in the past, he showed signs of tiring but he asked me to stay longer. I did only for a few moments for politeness sake and we discussed the University of Chicago program and he asked how Turkish studies were developing. I thanked him on behalf of the University for the continuation of the \$15,000 a year grant (during

the afternoon the Secretary General of CENTO, Turgut Menemencioglu had called on me and discussed this matter among a number of other things. Menemencioglu had been Turkish Ambassador to Washington when the grant was announced and he assured me that it was very difficult for the Turks to pay out even this amount of hard currency but that he was sure they would continue it now. However, he said, there was very little chance that it would be raised to the \$50,000 a year we had originally agreed upon.

As I was leaving, the President escorted me to the door and shaking hands warmly asked me to call on him any time that I was back in Turkey and assured me that he would always regard me as a personal friend and a friend of his government.